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A. In that Private (E-2) John Doe, U.S.
Army, Company A, 1st Battalion, 66th Infan-
try, did, at Action, Missouri, on or about 17 Oc-
tober 1977, wrongfully sell 1 gram, more or
less, of a habit forming narcotic drug, to wit:
heroin, to Private (E-2) Joseph Smith, U.S.
Army, while said Private (E-2) John Doe was
on official military business and in uniform.
B. In that Private (E-2) John Doe, U.S.
Army, Company A, 1st Battalion, 66th Infan-
try, while on official military business, did,
within Fort Blank, Missouri, an installation
under exclusive military control, on or about
1230 hours, 17 October 1977, unlawfully kill
Lisa Mason by driving a military sedan against
the said Lisa Mason in a negligent manner.
C. In that Private (E-2) John Doe, U.S.
Army, Company A, 1st Battalion, 66th Infan-
try, did, at Random, Missouri, on or about 18
October 1977, rape Private Jane Smith, while
said Private Jane Smith was -performing official
military duties as a military recruiter.
5. Offenses occurring overseas usually fall
within the "overseas exception" to O'Callahan
v. Parker, 395 US 258 (1969), as explained in
US v. Black, 51 CMR 381 (CMA 1976) and US
v. Lazzaro, 54 CMR 272 (CMA 1976). In such
cases the specification format- contained in ap-
pendix 6, MCM, may be amended by adding
language at the end stating "Said offense oc-
curring outside the territorial limits of the
United States and not being cognizable in a US
civilian court." Where the offense involves vio-
lation of a federal statute with extraterritorial
application, the same type subject matter
jurisdictional allegations may be used as if the
offense had been committed in CONUS.
6. Although USCMA now requires that a speci-
fication allege facts demonstrating jurisdiction,
where the jurisdictional facts are not related to
the guilt or innocence of the accused the trial
counsel should argue that these facts are di-
rected to the military judge only and are not
within the province of the court members to de-
termine.
7. In cases where no arraignment has yet been
held, the trial counsel should move to amend
the specifications to include the additional
jurisdictional language. As the amendment is in
the nature of a bill of particulars, the DAJA-CL
position is that it is not so substantial as to re-
quire reswearing of the charges.
8. The Alef decision demonstrates the difficulty
of sustaining jurisdiction in off-post offenses.
The staff judge advocate's analysis of the facts
using Relford criteria should lead to a logical
conclusion whether military jurisdiction lies in
a case. If the staff judge advocate is unable to
fashion a pleading using the Relford criteria,
there probably exists no military jurisdiction
under Relford or O'Callahan as presently in-
terpreted by USCMA.
Constructive Enlistments: Alive and Well
Captain David A. Schleuter, Instructor, Criminal Law Division, TJAGSA.
Riding in the turbulent wake of recent Court
of Military Appeals decisions, the concept of
constructive enlistments appeared to be going
down for the last time. Despite the predicted
demise1 of that concept, recent case law from
the Courts of Military Review seems to have
breathed some new life into it and, for the time
being, extended its existence. Before examin-
ing those opinions and their impact on the law
of enlistments, a brief review of the doctrine of
constructive enlistments is appropriate.
The constructive enlistment has long been
recognized as a means of changing one's status
from civilian to servicemember where some de-
ficiencies existed in the formal enlistment proc-
ess. The Army's Judge Advocate General rec-
ognized the concept as early as 1896.2 The vari-
ous Boards of Review addressed the issue on a
number of occasions3 and in United States v.
King 4 the Court of Military Appeals elaborated
on the theory, its practical effects, and its req-
uisites.
The court noted that constructive enlistment
contracts are creatures of the law and rest
solely on a "legal fiction and are not contract
obligations" in the true sense. 5 They are based
upon the philosophy that a man is presumed to
have promised to do what he ought to do to ful-
fill the contract. The court rejected the argu-
ment that a constructive enlistment had been
formed where the accused had entered the
Army with what was characterized by the court
as ex parte criminal conduct.8 The requisite
mutual intent of the parties to enter into a con-
tractual relationship was lacking.7
The concept and its variations have also been
relied upon by the Comptroller General in ap-
proving changes of status.8 And the federal
judiciary has, in several instances, applied the
same principles of equity upon which the con-
structive enlistment is grounded. 9
The requisites for a constructive enlistment
have been restated in a number of ways but the
most commonly accepted criteria are usually
stated as follows:





Performance of military duties;
Receipt of pay and allowances; and
Acceptance of the services by the govern-
ment.10
In condensed form the foregoing may be listed
as (1) voluntarily performing military duties
and (2) accepting military benefits. Until a
few years ago, if the servicemember entered
into an enlistment fraudulently, erroneously, or
in any other irregular manner, the government
was free to establish that the foregoing criteria
had been met and although the attempted for-
mal entry was in some way defective, a valid
constructive enlistment had taken place.1 2
That was the case of course prior to the ap-
plication by the Court of Military Appeals of
the equitable principle of estoppel to certain en-
listment problems. In a trio of cases, United
States v. Brown, 1 3 United States v. Catlow, 14
and United States v. Russo, '5 the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals laid a firm foundation for estop-
ping the government from relying upon con-
structive enlistments in order to establish in
personam court-martial jurisdiction. In Brown,
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7
the court applied the estoppel theory to minor-
ity enlistments; in Catlow to coerced enlist-
ments; and in Russo to fraudulent enlistments.
In all three instances the enlistments were
tainted to varying degrees by recruiter
misconduct.
This trio of cases raised more questions than
it answered-a result not atypical where a judi-
cial forum forges new law. For instance, what
degree of government misfeasance or malfea-
sance would cause invocation of the estoppel
doctrine? What degree of persuasion or proof
would satisfy a requirement of showing no gov-
ernment malfeasance or misfeasance? Although
the Court of Military Appeals has not finally
disposed of these and other questions, the
Courts of Military Review have addressed the
issues and seem to have resolved some of them.
Language in Russo indicated that recruiter
misconduct would void an enlistment if such
misconduct amounted to a violation of Article
84 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice. '
Russo's progeny seems to support the propo-
sition that if, indeed, a recruiter actively and
intentionally smoothes the enlistment path for
an individual who is clearly not qualified, the
resulting enlistment is defective and the re-
cruiter's misconduct estops the government
from relying upon a constructive enlistment.' 7
On the other hand, if the recruiter is simply
negligent in processing an individual and for
example fails to note a disqualifying factor, the
government will probably not be estopped from
showing a valid and binding constructive en-
listment. That is assuming of course that the
government can successfully show that the in-
dividual voluntarily performed military duties
and accepted military benefits. Simple negli-
gence was not deemed sufficient to estop the
government in United States v. Harrison,'8
United States v. Valdez, '9 and United States v.
Eqing.20
In United States v. Harrison, the recruiter
failed to detect the individual's scheme to effect
an underage enlistment. Because birth records
were unavailable, the recruiter relied upon a
family history in a "family Bible" presented by
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the accused. He checked the authenticity of the
entries and the accused's birthdate in a tele-
phonic conversation with a woman who iden-
tified herself as the accused's grandmother.
The court held that the accused's voluntary
performance of duties and receipt of benefits
after he reached the age of seventeen were
untainted-because the recruiter did not ac-
tually know that the accused was ineligible, he
did not violate Article 84. Hence a valid con-
structive enlistment could be shown.
The court in Valdez ruled similarly when a
recruiter failed to recognize that a combination
of factors (age, AFQT scores, and absence of a
high school diploma) rendered the accused in-
eligible for enlistment. The accused's entry into
the service was the result of simple negligence.
And in Ewing the recruiter's negligence in not
following up on the accused's joking references
to a criminal record was not considered to be
misconduct within the Russo rule.
2 1
If the recruiter's actions or inactions amount
to gross negligence, a different holding may re-
sult. For instance, in United States v.
Johnson,22 the court held that gross negligence
on the part of the recruiter in not detecting
that the individual was blind in one eye, had
the same effect of knowing misconduct. Be-
cause the government had a duty to discover
nonwaivable defects, it was estopped from rely-
ing upon a constructive enlistment. That
rationale unnecessarily expands the Russo
holding which appeared to limit the misconduct
in question to misconduct in violation of Article
84.23 Negligence, simple or gross, does not con-
stitute conduct punishable by that particular
article. 24 Failure to detect deceit should not be
equated with active and knowing assistance to
an ineligible recruit.
To this point, the discussion has centered on
malfeasance and misfeasance of the recruiter
who enlists the individual. What effect will
government malfeasance or misfeasance, occur-
ring after the enlistment is effected, have on
the enlistment? In United States v. Brown,
25
the failure of the military to discharge the
underage recruit was coupled with the actions
of the recruiter in arriving at the estoppel
theory. However, in United States v. Mar-
shall 26 the court rendered an expansive in-
terpretation of the holding in Brown to the ex-
tent that even assuming the ineligibility was
not known to the recruiter, later disclosures by
the individual to a clerk in a training unit
placed an affirmative duty upon the govern-
ment to take some action. 2 7 Failure to act
estopped the government from showing a con-
structive enlistment. In language reminiscent
of Brown, the court stated:
[S]hould this court apply the doctrine of
constructive enlistment, recruits would be
encouraged to conceal disqualifying infor-
mation and superiors would be encouraged
to ignore the information when it came to
their attention one way or another, in the
hope that with the passage of time the en-
listment would mature. This we decline to
do. ... 28
Marshall strongly suggests that regardless of
the amount of time actually served on the en-
listment contract, the government is not re-
lieved of the burden in detecting and ferreting
out ineligible enlistees. Under the Marshall
rationale, apparently little or no consideration
will be given to the long-term equities which
may exist. Because the individual in Marshall
reported his deficiencies almost immediately
upon completion of his enlistment process, that
case should be narrowly construed. However,
cases which do involve both pre-enlistment and
post-enlistment malfeasance will no doubt con-
tinue to fall within the Brown mandate of
estoppel.
There is yet another category of defective en-
listments in which the government may
nonetheless show constructive enlistments.
Those situations arise when the enlistment is
defective but the recruiter and other govern-
ment personnel are blameless. A recent exam-
ple of this appeared in United States v.
Wagner.29
Private Wagner enlisted to avoid the un-
pleasant prospect of civilian criminal prosecu-
tion for carrying a concealed weapon; he did so
upon the advice and urgings of his appointed -
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attorney and his parents. Although he did take
several preliminary tests, all processing of his
enlistment was halted when the recruiter
learned that criminal charges were pending.
Processing did not continue until after an "Or-
der Nolle Prosequi" had been entered in his
case. The court assumed, for the purposes of
review, that the enlistment was void at its in-
ception, 30 but declined to accept the arg.iment
that either intentional circumvention of the
regulations or negligence on the part of the re-
cruiter estopped the government from relying
upon a constructive enlistment. Reviewing the
record, the court concluded that a "construc-
tive enlistment was effectuated after the dis-
qualification was removed and prior to the
offense. "31
A similar holding was made in United States
v. De La Puente,32 where the accused alleged
that he had been coerced into enlisting by a
civilian judge. The court assumed, without de-
ciding, that the improper civilian conduct ren-
' dered the enlistment defective but the absence
of recruiter misconduct allowed a showing of
constructive enlistment.
These cases are illustrative of the attempts
by the Courts of Military Review to more
closely define the term "recruiter misconduct."
For now, they represent instances where, not-
withstanding irregularities in the formal en-
listment process, the government may estab-
lish a constructive enlistment.
The question remains as to what burden of
proof must be met by the government in estab-
lishing jurisdiction based upon a constructive
enlistment. There is a growing body of author-
ity which indicates that if the accused is being
tried for some offense other than AWOL or de-
sertion, the government must show in per-
sonam jurisdiction over the accused by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. 33 That position is
grounded on the rationale that unless the ac--
cused's military status is an element of the
offense, the question of jurisdiction is an inter-
locutory decision which requires only a showing
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(' Under either standard, once the accused
raises the issue of lack of jurisdiction because
of an irregular enlistment, the burden is on the
government to show (1) the absence of re-
cruiter misconduct, and (2) that a constructive
enlistment was effected if in fact the enlistment
was defective at its inception. In effect where
specific recruiter misconduct is alleged, the
prosecution is placed in the ironic position of
proving the innocence of the recruiter.
Meeting the first prong normally requires, at
a minimum, the live testimony of the recruiter
who processed the accused; the outcome more
often than not turns on the credibility of the
recruiter and the accused.3 4 The second prong,
showing constructive enlistment, may be satis-
fied in any number of ways. The longer the ac-
cused has voluntarily performed his duties and
received military benefits, the wider the range
of possibilities of proof will be. Factors such as
holding honored duty positions, performing
special duties, accelerated promotions, and
generally performing duties in a satisfactory
manner will go a long way toward showing vol-
untary performance of military duties. Volun-
tarily accepting, and otherwise taking advan-
tage of, military benefits in addition to the
normal monthly pay entitlements will usually
establish the second prong. For example, in
Wagner the accused had taken advantage of the
Army's alcohol and drug abuse program. As a
practical matter, these factors may be estab-
lished through the accused's superiors, person-
nel records, and in some cases during cross-
examination of the accused on the motion to
dismiss.
In approaching a case in which the enlistment
may present a question of jurisdiction, counsel
(both defense and prosecution) should address
the following:
1. Was the accused ineligible for enlist-
ment?3 5
2. If so, did the recruiter violate Article 84,
U.C.M.J.?
3. If the accused was ineligible for enlistment
but no recruiter violated Article 84, did
any subsequent misconduct by government
representatives perpetuate the irregular
enlistment?
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4. If the government is not estopped from
showing a constructive enlistment, what
facts,'if any, support or reiute a showing
of (1) voluntary performance of militarr
duties, and (2) acceptance of military bene-
fits?36
5. If a constructive enlistment cannot be
shown (because of the estoppel theory or
due to the lack of evidence) are there any
other bases for court-martial jurisdic-
tion?3 7
These questions present only a cursory analysis
of the problem. Only through research of the
appropriate statutes, regulations and case law
will counsel be able to efficiently present his
case for constructive enlistment and perfect the
record for appeal.
The concept of constructive enlistments has
taken an interesting turn but does appear to be
alive and well. Whether the Court of Military
Appeals will accept the holdings and rationale
of the intermediate appellate courts is another
question. It should. The concept of the con-
structive enlistment is a valuable tool and
should not be lightly cast aside.
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Professional Responsibility
Criminal Law Division, OTJAG
The OTJAG Professional Ethics Committee
recently considered a case involving the propri-
ety of a trial defense counsel's advice to his
client to resist attempts by criminal inves-
tigators to obtain samples of his hair for com-
parison with hair found at the scene of the
crime. Also considered were the counsel's
statements to the CID agents regarding the
law of seizure and the possibility of civil liabil-
ity should they forcibly obtain hair samples
from his client. The pertinent provisions of the
ABA Code of Professional Responsibility con-
sidered by the Committee are Disciplinary Rule
(DR) 7-102(A)(5) and (7), which state "(A) In
his representation of a client, a lawyer shall not
... (5) Knowingly make a false statement of
law or fact. . . (7) Counsel or assist his client in
conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or
fraudulent."
CPT A was detailed to represent PVT D,
who was under investigation for rape, sodomy
and burglary. PVT D had been identified by
the victim. In addition, hairs belonging to
someone other than the victim were found on a
couch in the victim's living room, where the al-
leged crimes occurred. Laboratory comparison
of hairs found at the scene with hair samples of
PVT D was sought. CPT A advised the trial
counsel and the CID agents that PVT D would
not consent to taking of the hair samples.
Nevertheless, the samples were taken by
agents while PVT D was in the post hospital for
psychiatric evaluation. CPT A was present and
assured himself that the agents did not have a
warrant.
Subsequently, PVT D was sent to another
post for further psychiatric evaluation. In re-
sponse to a request, CID agents at the second
post attempted to obtain additional hair sam-
ples from PVT D. Before proceeding to do so,
they received legal advice that the hair samples
could be obtained involuntarily. When the CID
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agents informed PVT D of their purpose, he
was allowed to call CPT A. CPT A advised PVT
D not to cooperate, but not to hurt anyone.
CPT A then spoke individually over the tele-
phone with the three agents who intended to
obtain the hair samples. To each agent he iden-
tified himself as PVT D's defense counsel, in-
formed them of his advice to PVT D, and
stated that the law of involuntary seizure of
hair samples was unsettled. He told them that
violation of his client's constitutional rights
could subject them to civil liability. CPT A
stated to one agent: "I hope you have insurance
for the actions you're going to take as I feel
there's a strong possibility of civil liability, be-
cause PVT D wants it clear he's not consenting
to your actions." CPT A stated he also in-
formed the agents to seek legal advice before
proceeding, and they did. Two days later the
agents took hair samples from PVT D, who re-
sisted by crawling under a bed and holding on
to the springs. The charges were eventually
dismissed upon recommendation of the Article
32 investigating officer.
Finding no ethical violations, the Committee
stated that CPT A's communications with the
CID agents and advice to his client were based
on his professional opinion that a search war-
rant was necessary for a forcible taking of hair
samples, as obtaining this evidence did not fall
within any of the recognized exceptions to the
general warrant requirement, e.g., search inci-
dent to arrest, protection of arresting officers
from physical harm, or preservation of destruc-
tible evidence. As there is no case law squarely
on point, the Committee concluded that CPT A
maintained his position in good faith and did
not make false statements of law when he told
the agents that the law concerning this matter
was not judicially settled. By instructing his
client that he could nonviolently resist taking of
the hair samples, counsel did nothing more than
attempt to preserve the issue for judicial con-
sideration. This attempt to preclude a claim of
waiver was reasonable considering the distance
separating counsel from his client. Likewise
CPT A's statement to the agents that they
could subject themselves to a civil lawsuit was
a conclusion which could follow from Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In
that case the United States Supreme Court
recognized a cause of action against federal
agents charged with violating citizens' fourth
amendment rights. CPT A's advice to the
agents did not constitute a threat of criminal
prosecution proscribed by DR 7-105. Finally,
CPT A's statement concerning the agents' need
for insurance was determined to be inappro-
priate, but not unethical. His apparent lack of
composure in this respect was considered tem-
pered by the fact that his role as defense coun-
sel was known to the agents, and he had ad-
vised them also to seek legal advice.
Judiciary Notes
U.S. Army Judiciary
NOTES FROM EXAMS & NEW TRIALS DI-
VISION
1. Records of Trial. Staff judge advocates
should take corrective action to assure that
general court-martial records of trial forwarded
to the U.S. Army Judiciary (JALS-ED) for
examination under Articles 61 and 69, including
acquittals and other dispositions, contain origi-
nal documents, such as Charge Sheet (DD
Form 458), Article 32 Report of Investigation
(DD Form 457) and exhibits, Pretrial Advice,
Request for Trial by Military Judge Alone, Re-
quest for Enlisted Court-Martial Members.
2. Applications for Relief. Whenever possible,
the application for relief (DA Form 3499,
signed personally by the applicant and properly
notarized) should be submitted through the of-
fice of the staff judge advocate who was re-
sponsible for completion of the review under
Article 65(c), U.C.M.J. That staff judge advo-
cate should forward the application, together
with the original record of trial, with appro-
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priate comments and pertinent documents
(such as certificates or affidavits) concerning
the allegations set forth in the application. The
documents should be sent to HQDA (JALS-
ED), Nassif Building, Falls Church, 'Virginia
22041, by certified mail.
NOTE FROM DEFENSE APPELLATE DI-
VISION
The Advocate, A Journal For Military Defense
Counsel, prepared by the attorneys at Defense
Appellate Division, is in the process of upgrad-
ing its mailing list. Any defense counsel office
that is not receiving The Advocate or is receiv-
ing it at an improper address should send DA
Form 3955 (Change of Address and Directory
Record) to: Managing Editor, The Advocate,
Defense Appellate Division, Nassif Building,
Falls Church, Virginia 22041. Please note that
The Advocate addressees must be offices-not
individuals, and may receive only one copy each
due to publishing costs.
Article 137 Training Aids
Criminal Law Division, TJAGSA
Article 137 of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice requires that specified articles of the
Code be carefully explained to each enlisted
member of the service on three occasions: (1)
upon the member's entrance on active duty or
within six months; (2) after the member has
completed six months of active duty; (3) and
JCN, upon the member's reenlistment. To facilitate
compliance with this statutory requirement,
three training films have been produced:
TF 27-4863 "The Article 15";
TF 27-4821 "UCMJ Part I-Pretrial, Trial,
and Post-Trial";
TF 27-4986 "UCMJ Part II-Offenses,
Rights and Safeguards."
These films are in color, contemporary, and
fast paced. They are designed to maintain a
high audience interest level. Use of the three
films satisfies Article 137 requirements. Note
that TF 27-4986 has two brief instructional
packages, one of which must be employed with
this three-film series, in order to meet Article
137 standards. One instructional package may
be used by an instructor to emphasize certain
articles. If no instructor is present, the other
package, covering the same material, may be
read by a student after viewing the three films.
These films should be available at installation
level through the local audio-visual support
center.
JAG School Note
On 22 September 1977, Mrs. Mary Salt, age
68, Claims Adjudicator in the US Army Claims
Service, Europe, died while on vacation on the
Isle of Wight in her native England. Mrs Salt
was originally employed by the US Forces in
October 1943 and served in Judge Advocate of-
fices since 1944. After working in claims in
Versailles, Frankfurt, and Heidelberg, her last
several years were with the Claims Service in
Mannheim. Mrs Salt was well-known for her
considerable expertise in the area of personnel
claims. The Judge Advocate General's Corps
has lost a loyal, dedicated employee, and a true
friend.
CLE News
1. Virginia Rejects Mandatory CLE. The Su-
preme Court of Virginia rejected a proposed
rule that would have required mandatory CLE
/, for all practicing Virginia attorneys. In reject-
ing the order on September 9, 1977, the Court
said it "would not be in the best interest of the
public and the legal profession to adopt such a
rule at this time."
2. Available Video cassettes. Television Oper-
ations of The Judge Advocate General's School
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announces that videocassettes of the 1977
Army Judge Advocate General's Conference,
held 11 through 14 October 1977, are available,
in 'color, to the field. Listed below are titles,
running times and guest speakers. If you desire
TAPE # TITLE
1 OTJAG PERSONNEL REPORT, PA
any of these programs, please send a blank %
inch videocassette of the appropriate length to
The Judge Advocate General's School, U.S.
Army, ATTN: Television Operations, Charlot-
tesville, Virginia 22901.
RTI
Speakers: Colonel William K. Laray, Executive, Office of The Judge
Advocate General, and Lieutenant Colonel William K. Suter, Chief,
Personnel, Plans & Training Office, Office of The Judge Advocate
General.
2 OTJAG PERSONNEL REPORT, PART II
A Continuation of Tape 1
3 USAR REPORT
Speaker: Lieutenant Colonel Jack H. Williams, Assistant Commandant
for Reserve Affairs and Special Projects, TJAGSA.
4 ENLISTED PERSONNEL REPORT
Speakers: Captain John F. DePue, JAGC Representative, MILPER-
CEN and Master Sergeant Gunther M. Nothnagel, MILPERCEN.
5 ORGANIZATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS
Speaker: Brigadier General John H. Johns, Director of Human Re-
sources Development, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Person-
nel, Department of the Army.
6 USALSA REPORT
Speaker: Brigadier General Hugh J. Clausen, Chief, U.S. Army Legal
Services Agency.
7 NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CRIMINAL LAW
(Including separate defense organization)
Speaker: Colonel Wayne E. Alley, Criminal Law Division, Office of
The Judge Advocate General.
8 GAD/DAD REPORTS
Speakers: Colonel Thomas H. Davis, Chief, Government Appellate Di-
vision, U.S. Army Judiciary and Colonel Robert B. Clarke, Chief, De-
fense Appellate Division, U.S. Army Judiciary.
9 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PART I
Speakers: Colonel Thomas E. Murdock, Chief Trial Judge, U.S. Army
Judiciary; Major Kenneth Gray, Criminal Law Division, TJAGSA;
Major Michael Carmichael, Criminal Law Division, OTJAG; and Major
Joseph Miller, Field Defense Services, Defense Appellate Division,
USALSA.
10 PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, PART II
A continuation of Tape 9.
11 CONTRACTING OUT


















AR 15-6 and AR 600-50
Speaker: Colonel Darrell L. Peck, Chief, Administrative Law Divi-
sion, OTJAG
13 EEO CASE PREPARATION
Speaker: Lieutenant Colonel Carroll J. Tichenor, Chief, Labor and
Civilian Personnel Law Office.
14 ADDRESS
Speaker: Lieutenant General DeWitt C. Smith, Deputy Chief of Staff
for Personnel, Department of the Army.
15 OPENING REMARKS; USAREUR REPORT
Speaker: Brigadier General Victor A. DeFiori, Judge Advocate, U.S.
Army Europe and Seventh Army.
16 INTERNATIONAL LAW UPDATE
Speaker: Mr. Waldemar A. Solf, International Affairs Division, OT-
JAG.
17 ANTI-DEFICIENCY ACT
Speaker: Captain Gary L. Hopkins, Procurement Law Division,
TJAGSA.
18 KOREA UPDATE
Speaker: Colonel Richard J. Bednar, Judge Advocate, Eighth U.S.
Army.
19 TAJAG REMARKS
Speaker: Major General Lawrence H. Williams, The Assistant Judge
Advocate General.
20 GENERAL OFFICER PANEL
Major General Wilton B. Persons, Jr., Major General Lawrence H.
Williams, Brigadier General Victor A. DeFiori, Brigadier General
Hugh J. Clausen, Brigadier General Alton H. Harvey, Brigadier Gen-
eral Joseph N. Tenhet, Brigadier General Demetri M. Spiro, and
Brigadier General Edward D. Clapp.
21 CLOSING REMARKS














3. 8th Advanced Procurement Attorneys'
Course and 4th Allowability of Contract
Costs Course. The theme for the 8th Advanced
Procurement Attorneys' Course, scheduled for
9-13 January 1978, is "Construction Contract-
ing." The tentative schedule of guest speakers
includes:
Mr. Gilbert Cuneo, Executive Partner, Sell-
ers, Conner & Cuneo, Washington, D.C.
Professor Ralph Nash, Professor of Law,(
The George Washington National
Washington, D.C.
Law Center,
Mr. Al Joseph of Pettit, Evers and Martin,
San Francisco, California.
Mr. Overton Currie of Smith, Currie & Han-
cock, Atlanta, Georgia.




Mr. Eldon Crowell, Partner, Reavis, Pogue,
Neal & Rose, Washington, D.C.
Judge Richard Solibakke, Chairman, Armed
Services Board of Contract Appeals, Washing-
ton, D.C.
One day of the course will be dedicated to a
presentation developed by Mr. E. M. Seltzer,
Chief Counsel, Corps of Engineers, Washing-
ton, D.C.
The Advanced Procurement Attorneys'
Course will be followed immediately by the 4th
Allowability of Contract Costs Course on 16-18
January 1978. Mr. Roger Boyd, Partner, Rea-
vis, Pogue, Neal & Rose, Washington, D.C.,
will be a guest speaker on the Cost Accounting
Standards.
4. TJAGSA CLE Courses. Information on the
prerequisites and content of TJAGSA courses
is printed in CLE News, The Army Lawyer,
September 1977, at 35.
November 14-18: 36th Senior Officer Legal
Orientation Course (SF-Fl).
November 28-December 1: 5th Fiscal Law
Course (5F-F12).
December 5-8: 4th Military Administrative
Law Developments Course (5F-F25).
December 12-15: 5th Military Administrative
Law Developments Course (5F-F25).
January 3-6: 2d Claims Course (5F-F26).
January 9-13: 8th Procurement Attorneys'
Advanced Course (5F-F11).
January 9-13: 6th Law of War Instructor
Course (5F-F42).
January 16-18: 4th Allowability of Contract
Costs Course (5F-F13).
January 16-19: 1st Litigation Course (5F-
F29).
January 23-27: 37th Senior Officer Legal
Orientation Course.
February 6-9: 6th Fiscal Law Course (5F-
F12).
February 6-10: 38th Senior Officer Legal
Orientation Course (5F-Fl).
February 13-17: 4th Criminal Trial Advocacy
Course (5F-F32).
February 27-March 10: 74th Procurement
Attorneys' Course (5F-F10).
March 7-10: 39th Senior Officer Legal Orien-
tation Course (5F-Fl).
March 13-17: 7th Law of War Instructor
Course (5F-F42).
April 3-7: 17th Federal Labor Relations
Course (5F-F22).
April 3-7: 4th Defense Trial Advocacy
Course (SF-F34).
April 10-14: 40th Senior Officer Legal Orien-
tation Course (5F-Fl).
April 17-21: 8th Staff Judge Advocate Orien-
tation Course (5F-F52).
April 17-28: 1st International Law I Course
(5F-F40).
April 24-28: 5th Management for Military
Lawyers Course (5F-F51).
May 1-12: 7th Procurement Attorneys'
Course (5F-F10).
May 8-11: 7th Environmental Law Course
(5F-F27).
May 15-17: 2d Negotiations Course (5F-
F14).
May 15-19: 8th Law of War Instructor
Course (5F-F42).
May 22-June 9: 17th Military Judge Course
(5F-F33).
June 12-16: 41st Senior Officer Legal Orien-
tation Course (5F-Fl).
June 19-30: Noncommissioned Officers Ad-
vanced Course Phase II (71D50)
July 24-August 4: 76th Procurement Attor-
neys' Course (5F-F10).




August 7-18: 2d Military Justice II Course
(5F-F31).
August 21-25: 42d Senior Officer Legal
Orientation Course (5F-Fl).
August 28-31: 75th Fiscal Law Course (5F-
F12).
September 18-29: 77th Procurement Attor-
neys' Course (SF-F 10).
5. Civilian Sponsored CLE Courses.
December
1-2: PLI, Remedies for Breach of Contract, Los
Angeles Hilton Hotel, Los Angeles, CA. Contact: Nancy
B. Hinman, Practising Law Institute, 810 7th Ave., New
York, NY 10019. Phone (212) 765-5700. Cost: $175.
1-2: PLI, Practical Will Drafting, Barbizon Plaza
Hotel, New York, NY. Contact: Nancy B. Hinman, Prac-
tising Law Institute, 810 7th Ave., New York, NY 10019.
Phone (212) 765-5700. Cost: $175.
1-3: National Council of Juvenile Court Judges, The
Unmet Challenge of the '70's-Juvenile Justice for Young
Women, Hilton Gateway Inn, Kissimmee (Orlando), FL.
SContact: Project Director, National Council of Juvenile
Court Judges, Department MM, Univ. of Nevada, P.O.
Box 8978, Reno, NV 89507. Phone (702) 784-6012.
4-9: NCDA, Advanced Organized Crime, Columbus,
OH. Contact: Registrar, National College of District At-
torneys, College of Law, Univ. of Houston, Houston, TX
77004. Phone (713) 749-1571.
4-9: NCSJ, Court Administration-Specialty, Judicial
College Bldg., Univ. of Nevada, Reno NV. Contact:
Judge Ernst John Watts, Dean, National College of the
State Judiciary, Judicial College Bldg., Univ. of Nevada,
Reno, NV 89557. Phone (702) 784-6747. Cost: $350.
4-16: NCSJ, The Judge and the Trial (Graduate), Judi-
cial College Bldg., Univ. of Nevada, Reno, NV. Contact:
Judge Ernst John Watts, Dean, National College of the
State Judiciary, Judicial College Bldg., Univ. of Nevada,
Reno, NV 89557. Phone (702) 784-6747. Cost: $540.
5-6: PLI, Foreign Trusts and Foreign Estates: Plan-
ning for United States and Foreign Persons, Barbizon
Plaza Hotel, New York, NY. Contact: Nancy B. Hinman,
Practising Law Institute, 810 7th Ave., New York, NY
10019. Phone (212) 765-5700. Cost: $185.
5-7: George Washington Univ. National Law
Center-Federal Publications, The Practice of Equal
Employment, Miami, FL. Contact: Seminar Division,
Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Washington,
DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost: $425.
5-7: Federal Publications, Practical Negotiation of
Government Contracts, Williamsburg, VA. Contact:
Seminar Division, Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St.
NW, Washington, DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost:
$425.
7-9: Federal Publications, Changes in Government
Contracts, Washington, DC. Contact: Seminar Division,
Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Washington,
DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost: $425.
9-10: ALI-ABA, Practice under the Federal Rules of
Evidence: Recent Developments, San Diego, CA. Con-
tact: Donald M. Maclay, Director, Courses of Study,
ALI-ABA Committee on Continuing Professional Educa-
tion, 4025 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104. Phone
(215) 387-3000.
11-16: NCSJ, Alcohol and Drugs-Specialty, Judicial
College Bldg., Univ. of Nevada, Reno, NV 89557. Phone
(702) 784-6747. Cost: $350.
12-13: Negotiation Institute, The Art of Negotiating,
Hyatt Regency O'Hara, Chicago, IL. Contact: Negotia-
tion Institute, Inc., 230 Park Ave., New York, NY
10017. Phone (212) 986-5558. Cost: $450.
12-14: George Washington Univ. National Law
Center-Federal Publications, Living with OSHA,
Miami, FL. Contact: Seminar Division, Federal Publica-
tions Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Washington, DC 20006. Phone
(202) 337-7000.
12-14: George Washington Univ. National Law Center,
Patents and Technical Data [procurement aspects of pat-
ents and technical data in government contracting], Cen-
tury Plaza Hotel, Los Angeles, CA. Contact: Government
Contracts Program, George Washington Univ., 2000 H
St. NW, Washington, DC 20052. Phone (202) 676-6815.
Cost: $400.
12-14: Federal Publications, Cost Estimating for Gov-
ernment Contracts, Washington, DC. Contact: Seminar
Division, Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW,
Washington, DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-8200. Cost:
$425.
12-16: Federal Publications, The Masters Institute in
Government Contracting, San Francisco, CA. Contact:
Seminar Division, Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St
NW, Washington, DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost:
$600.
13-15: LEI, Environmental Law Seminar, Berkeley,
CA. Contact: Legal Education Institute-TOG, U.S.
Civil Service Commission, 1900 E St. NW, Washington,
DC 20415. Phone (202) 254-3483.
14-16: Federal Publications, Contracting for Services,
Washington, DC. Contact: Seminar Division, Federal
Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Washington, DC
20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost: $425.
15-17: PLI, Advanced Criminal Trial Tactics for Prose-
cution and Defense, New York Hilton Hotel, New York,
NY. Contact: Nancy B. Hinman, Practising Law Insti-
tute, 810 7th Ave., New York, NY 10019. Phone (212)
765-5700. Cost: $200.
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19-21: Federal Publications, Renegotiation of Govern-
ment Contracts, Washington, DC. Contact: Seminar Di-
vision, Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Wash-
ington, DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost: $475.
19-21: Federal Publications, Changes in Government
Contracts, San Diego, CA. Contact: Seminar Division,
Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW, Washington,
DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000. Cost: $425.
19-21: George Washington Univ. National Law
Center-Federal Publications, Equal Employment
Claims & Litigation, Las Vegas, NV. Contact: Seminar
Division, Federal Publications Inc., 1725 K St. NW,
Washington, DC 20006. Phone (202) 337-7000.
19-21: NYU School of Continuing Education, Govern-
ment Project Management, Chicago, IL. Contact:
SCENYU Registrations, New York Conference Man-
agement Center, 360 Lexington Ave., New York, NY
10017. Cost: $355 for the first person and $295 for each
additional person.
January
12-13: PLI, Remedies for Breach of Contract,
Americana Hotel, New York, NY. Contact: Nancy B.
Hinman, Practising Law Institute, 810 7th Ave., New
York, NY 10019. Phone (212) 765-5700. Cost: $175.
15-20: NCDA, Prosecutor's Office Administrator
Course, Part III, Houston, TX. Contact: Registrar, Na-
tional College of District Attorneys, College of Law,
Univ. of Houston, Houston, TX 77004. Phone (713) 749-
1571.
19-21: ALI-ABA-State Bar of Arizona, Labor Law for
the General Practitioner, Phoenix, AZ. Contact: Donald
M. Maclay, Director, Courses of Study, ALI-ABA Com-
mittee on Continuing Professional Education, 4025
Chestnut St., Philadelphia, PA 19104. Phone (215) 387-
3000.
29-1 Feb.: NCDA, Major Fraud, San Diego, CA. Con-
tact: Registrar, National College of District Attorneys,
College of Law, Univ. of Houston, Houston, TX 77004.
Phone (713) 749-1571.
Administrative and Civil Law Section
Administrative and Civil Law Division, TJAGSA
The Judge Advocate General's Opinions
1. (Nonappropriated Fund Instrumentalities,
Operational Principles) The Risk Management
Program Self-Insurance Coverage Does Not
Extend To Private Property In The Posses-
sion Of A Nonappropriated Fund Instrumen-
tality. DAJA-AL 1977/3920, 7 Apr. 1977. The
custodian of an Army hotel (transient billets), a
nonappropriated fund instrumentality, asked if
the fund could limit its liability for valuables
left by guests with the hotel for safekeeping to
$15,000. The Judge Advocate General noted
that the Risk Management Program of self-
insurance covers only property acquired with
nonappropirated funds or donated to # nonap-
propriated fund instrumentality (para. 7b, AR
230-16) and, therefore, its coverage does not
extend to private property in the possession of
a nonappropriated fund instrumentality and its
limits of liability do not apply. Under the provi-
sions of Chapter 12, AR 27-20, a claim could be
made against a NAFI for bailed property which
is tortiously damaged or lost by it (para. 17,
AR 230-16 and para. 1-6, DA Pam 230-3). In
the case of such a claim, the extent of the
NAFI liability would depend on the facts of the
case and could not be determined in advance.
The Judge Advocate General suggested that
the surest method of limiting the potential lia-
bility of a nonappropriated fund instrumental-
ity for tortious loss or damage of property
bailed to it was not to accept property above a
designated monetary value.
2. (Information and Records, Filing of Informa-
tion) Policy On Filing Aborted Elimination
Action As Inclosure To Letter Of Reprimand
UP AR 600-37. DAJA-AL 1977/3951, 15 Apr.
1977. An officer was recommended for elimina-
tion UP AR 635-100 for moral and professional
dereliction. This action was dropped and, in
lieu thereof, he was given an administrative
letter of reprimand (LOR) UP para. 2-4, AR
600-37, for permanent filing in his Official Mili-
tary Personnel File (OMPF). The officer simply
acknowledged receipt of the LOR when advised
of the proposed action. The letter arrived at
MILPERCEN with two inclosures relating to
the aborted elimination action. MILPERCEN
requested an opinion on the legality of filing
these allied papers with the LOR.
TJAG advised that only material submitted
by a member in response to a LOR and any
listed inclosures thereto should be filed in the
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OMPF UP (then) para. 2-4a (2), AR 600-37
(currently para. 2-4c (3)). TJAG expressed the
view that only the officer's acknowledgement of
receipt (1st Ind) met this condition. It was
noted that para. 2-3h (now para. 2-3g), AR
600-37, authorizes the filing, without further
referral to the member concerned, of unfavora-
ble information of which the member has prior
knowledge and has had an opportunity to re-
fute. However, it was not clear from the corre-
spondence in this case that the commander in-
tended filing under authority of then para. 2-3h
or that the officer had the opportunity to re-
view and comment on all correspondence in-
cluded in the elimination case file. TJAG also
viewed as inconsistent with the underlying
policies of AR 600-37, the filing of an aborted
elimination action in the OMPF, as the action
can hardly be considered "resolved." Individual
documents (e.g., witness statements or case
summaries without reference to the aborted ac-
tion) may, however, be appropriate for filing if
they meet all other requirements of the regula-
(r-, tion. It was recommended that MILPERCEN
query the commander as to the purported au-
thority for forwarding the elimination package,
as well as the extent of the officer's opportunity
to rebut.
3. (Information and Records, Release and Ac-
cess) Opinions of The Judge Advocate Gen-
eral Intended To Have Broad Application
May Not Be Exempt From Release As Inter-
nal Memoranda. DAJA-AL 1977/4008, 15 Apr.
1977. A copy of a certain opinion of The Judge
Advocate General was requested by a law firm.
While opinions of The Judge Advocate General
are generally exempt from release as internal
memoranda (FOIA Exemption 5), it was de-
cided to furnish a copy of the requested opinion
to the law firm in question. The Judge Advo-
cate General noted that opinions limited to the
particular facts of specific cases which are not
intended to have a broad application are gener-
ally exempt from release under Exemption 5.
On the other hand, when the opinion is a
statutory interpretation intended to be applied
in all cases of a similar nature, it may be re-
leasable.
4. (Civilian Employees) ABCMR Has Author-
ity To Correct Military Records Of Civilian
Employees. DAJA-AL 197714188, 15 Apr.
1977. A question concerning the authority of
the ABCMR to correct records of civilian em-
ployee grievance proceedings resulted in an
opinion by the Administrative Law Division,
OTJAG, concerning the extent of the ABCMR's
authority to correct records pertaining to civil-
ian employees in general. The opinion noted
that the ABCMR has authority over "military
records" relating to civilian employees and
reiterated that it is the nature of the record,
not the status of the individual which is the
jurisdictional issue. Earlier opinions of The
Judge Advocate General indicated that a record
is considered a military record when it is is-
sued, created or prepared by military authority
for use by the military and is administered as a
military record. The opinion then differentiates
between official personnel folders of civilian
employees and grievance records. The former
are records of the Civil Service Commission,
custody of which is granted to the Army as
employing agency under paragraph 2-5a, Chap-
ter 293, FPM. Because Civil Service Regula-
tions control their creation and maintenance,
they are not military records and accordingly
not reviewable by the ABCMR. No allegation
of failure to exhaust an administrative remedy
before the ABCMR has been raised in any civil-
ian employee litigation involving these records.
On the other hand, the opinion points out
that grievance records are generated by the
Army grievance system established pursuant to
paragraph 3-6, Chapter 771, FPM. Because
these records are entirely internal to the
Army, filed locally, and not subject to review
by the Civil Service Commission, the opinion
states that they are within the jurisdiction of
the ABCMR. Although paragraph 3-13c, CPR
771.3, provides that the MACOM's decision of a
grievance is final and not reviewable further
within DA, this provision appears not to be
specific enough to limit the broad grant of
jurisdiction by the Secretary of the Army to
the ABCMR under AR 15-185. According to
the opinion, a narrow reading of this provision
would thwart the remedial purpose of 10
U.S.C. § 1552 in creating the ABCMR; and
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therefore, it appears only to provide adminis-
trative finality for ripeness of any ABCMR re-
view.
5. (Separation From Service, Grounds) Medi-
cal Opinion That EM Has Character/Be-
havior Disorder As Result Of Injury On Ac-
tive Duty Does Not Preclude Discharge UP
Expeditious Discharge Program and Re-
coupment Of Enlistment Bonus. DAJA-AL
1977/4296, 16 May 1977. EM enlisted in the
Army for a four-year term under a cash bonus
enlistment option. Two years later, he was dis-
charged with an honorable discharge under the
Expeditious Discharge Program (AR 635-200).
Action was initiated to recoup the unearned
portion of his reenlistment bonus (37 U.S.C. §
308a(b) and para. 9-2b, AR 600-200).
The EM applied to the ABCMR, requesting
his discharge be changed to a medical discharge
and that he not be required to repay any of the
bonus. The stated justification was that he re-
ceived a concussion when the deck lid of a tank
fell on his head, bringing on headaches which
contributed to actions leading to his separation
under the EDP. He argued that because of his
injury, his problems were not his own fault and
the recoupment action was improper.
OTSG advised ABCMR that EM's post-
concussion syndrome did not qualify him for a
medical discharge although he had a charac-
ter/behavior disorder sufficient to cause him to
be administratively unfit. It was stated further
that as EM had no recognition his behavior was
unsatisfactory, it "should not be medically
judged to be voluntary or due to his own fault."
OTSG recommended ABCMR obtain a legal
opinion on the matter.
TJAG advised ABCMR that the recoupment
action was legally correct under applicable
statutory and regulatory provisions. It was
pointed out that EM voluntarily consented to
the EDP discharge after proper notice. Medical
evidence indicated EM had a charac-
ter/behavior disorder; however, this disorder
did not prevent him from agreeing to the EDP
action.
6. (Information and Records, Release and Ac-
cess) Lateral Investigation Not Exempt From
Release Under FOIA Exemption 5. DAJA-AL
1977/4379, 26 May 1977. A Freedom of Infor-
mation Act request was received for the report
of an investigation of an explosion in which
civilian employees were injured. The investiga-
tion was not the safety investigation required
by AR 385-40, but was a collateral investiga-
tion. The Judge Advocate General decided to
release the report of investigation in its en-
tirety. It was noted that the investigation was
primarily factual in nature and that while fac-
tual portions of some safety investigations may
be withheld under Exemption 5 of the Freedom
of Information Act, the exemption is limited to
the safety investigation and does not include
collateral investigations required by regulation
or conducted at the prerogative of a com-
mander. It was also pointed out that the find-
ings and recommendations of reports of inves-
tigation would normally be withholdable under
FOIA Exemption 5. However, when recom-
mendations are approved and in effect become
the decision of the agency they are no longer
exempt from release.
7. (Prohibited Activities and Standards of Con-
duct, Gifts) Appropriated Funds May Not Be
Used To Purchase Plaques For Presentation
To Departing Personnel As A Farewell Ges-
ture. DAJA-AL 1977/4827, 1 July 1977. A staff
judge advocate asked if it was legal to use ap-
propriated funds to purchase service award
plaques to present to departing personnel. It
was noted that AR 672-1 implements section
1125, title 10, United States Code, subsection
(1) of which authorizes limited discretion in the
procurement of certain types of items with ap-
propriated funds for presentation to "members,
units, or agencies of an armed force" for "excel-
lence in accomplishments or competitions re-
lated to that armed force." Subsection (2) au-
thorizes the purchase of only "badges or but-
tons in recognition of special service, good con-
duct and discharge under conditions other than
dishonorable." On this basis, it was opined that
neither the statute nor the regulation consti-
tuted authority to use appropriated funds for
the purchase of farewell plaques. It was also
noted that para. 1-6j, AR 672-20, prohibits pre-
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sentation of incentive awards as a farewell ges-
ture.
Editorial Note: Due to the employment of a dif-
ferent indexing system, this opinion is indexed
at OTJAG under the topic "Funds, Awards and
Decorations." This case was not viewed or
treated as a standards of conduct case. Neither
AR 600-50 nor DoD Directive 5500.7 were con-
sidered.
8. (Separation From The Service, Discharge)
Execution Of Approved AR 635-206 Discharge
Will Be Withheld Pending Appeal Where EM
Remains In Civil Confinement. DAJA-AL
1977/4866, 1 July 1977. A Texas court convicted
an EM of a felony and sentenced him to an in-
determinate sentence of 5 to 30 years confine-
ment. His confinement began on 1 Jan. 1975. A
board of officers convened UP AR 635-206 on
13 Apr. 1977 and recommended he be dis-
charged under other than honorable conditions.
The convening authority recommended MIL-
PERCEN that the EM be separated im-
nediately, prior to completion of appellate re-
view, because of the nature of the crime, the
length of his absence from the Army, and the
anticipated length of appellate action.
Citing paragraph 34, AR 635-206, which im-
plements paragraph F, Inc. 5, DoD Directive
1332.14, TJAG advised that separation of a
member with an approved discharge based on a
civil conviction prior to final appellate action
will be approved only in "very unusual" and
"extenuating" circumstances. Immediate dis-
charge normally will not arise where the
member will remain in civil confinement pend-
ing action on the appeal. TJAG expressed the
view there were no "very unusual" or "ex-
tenuating" circumstances in this case which al-
lowed deviation from the general policy to
withhold execution pending the outcome of the
appeal.
1977 Judge Advocate General's Reserve Training Workshop
Reserve Affairs Department, TJAGSA
Over 100 Reserve Component judge advocate
officers representing Military Law Centers,
JAGSO Detachments, Army Reserve Com-
mands, Training Divisions, Garrisons, Civil Af-
fairs Units and Support Commands gathered at
The Judge Advocate General's School from 7 to
9 September 1977 to attend the Judge Advo-
cate General's Reserve Training Workshop
(Conference). Command judge advocates of the
active Army from FORSCOM, TRADOC and
the CONUS armies joined the reserve judge
advocates in discussing the Premobilization
Legal Counseling Program, Troop Program
Unit assignment policies, reserve training,
OPMS-USAR, and other reserve matters. Fol-
lowing registration activities and a reception
for conferees on Tuesday evening, the 6th, con-
ference business began the following morning
with welcoming remarks by TJAGSA Comman-
dant, Colonel Barney L. Brannen, Jr., and a
keynote address by Major General Lawrence
H. Williams, The Assistant Judge Advocate
General.
The first day activities included a report by
Lieutenant Colonel Neil Roche, Commander,
3d Military Law Center, on the court reporter
training program developed by that law center
and insight into the recently developed
OPMS-USAR program by Colonel Edward J.
Van Horn, Director of Officer and Enlisted
Personnel Management Directorate, RCPAC.
Officer Personnel Management System
(OPMS-USAR) is the career management sys-
tem developed at RCPAC for the management
of all USAR officers and is analogous on the ac-
tive army side to MILPERCEN. The program
offers members of the IRR up to 35 days of
counterpart training, i.e., training with, or in
an active army SJA office. Colonel Van Horn
pointed out that the initial testing in Readiness
Region VI met with considerable success and
the program is scheduled to expand into other
Readiness Regions 1 October 1977. The morn-





The afternoon session was highlighted by a
question and answer period on OPMS-USAR
and closed with workshops for the Military Law
Center commanders and ARCOM and GOCOM
staff judge advocates.
Brigadier General Demetri M. (Jim) Spiro,
Chief, Judge, U.S. Army Legal Services
Agency, MOB DES, chaired the second day's
events, and after his opening remarks Colonel
Charles A. Brant, Commander, 9th Military
Law Center, discussed the IDT training pro-
gram developed by his law center and how it
could be applied to other law centers and
JAGSO teams. Next, an update in Procurement
and International Law was provided by mem-
bers of TJAGSA faculty. An informative ad-
dress by Brigadier Generals Clapp and Spiro on
the recent attempt to eliminate JAG reserve
pay slots followed these presentations. In their
talk, Generals Spiro and Clapp outlined the
background of the appropriation bill which was
reported out by the House Defense Appropria-
tion Subcommittee of the House Appropriation
Committee in May and contained a rider rec-
ommending, among other things, that units
performing legal functions be removed from
Pay Group A (48 paid drills per year plus 15
days annual training) and be placed in Pay
Group D (authorized only 15 days annual train-
ing) for fiscal year 1978. The House Bill 7983
containing this language was eventually passed
by the House Committee and sent to the Sen-
ate. The Senate committee subsequently re-
jected the House position and reported out the
bill without reference to eliminating the 48 paid
drills for JAG detachments. The language in
the House version of the bill was subsequently
deleted in a joint House-Senate conference.
General Clapp indicated that the issue will un-
doubtedly surface again in the next fiscal year
and that JAG reserve units must document all
of their functions in order to be prepared for
this issue when it arises again. The morning
program concluded with a report on the U.S.
Naval Reserve Program by Rear Admiral Pen-
rose Albright, Director Naval Reserve Law
Program. The afternoon session consisted of
workshops headed by the CONUS army staff
judge advocates.
The traditional conference banquet was held
that evening in the TJAGSA consolidated club.
Brigadier General Demetri M. Spiro, Chief
Judge, U.S. Army Legal Services Agency,
MOB DES, was the featured speaker at the
conference banquet. In his address to the at-
tendees, General Spiro stressed the importance
of maintaining a well-trained reserve force as a
means of aiding national security, and ex-
pressed his appreciation to the JAG reserve
components and TJAGSA for their efforts in
continually upgrading the JAG reserve
program.
Brigadier General Edward D. Clapp, Assist-
ant Judge Advocate General for Special As-
signments, MOB DES, opened and chaired the
Friday sessions of the conference and his re-
marks were followed by an update in the claims
area. Recent developments in several areas of
administrative law were then discussed. The
agenda concluded with reports from First,
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Current Materials of Interest
Articles
The DUKE LAW JOURNAL, Volume 1977,
Number 2, May 1977, contains the eighth an-
nual survey of major developments in federal
administrative law. The notes included in the
survey are:
Democratic Due Process: Administrative
Procedure After Bishop v. Wood;
FTC v. Simeon Management Corp.: The
First Amendment and the Need for Prelimi-
nary Injunctions of Commercial Speech;
Ethical Problems for the Law Firm of a
Former Government Attorney: Firm or Indi-
vidual Disqualification;
Developments Under the Freedom of Infor-
mation Act-1976;
The Government in the Sunshine Act-An
Overview;
Interim Rate Relief for Public Utilities
Pending Judicial Appeal of Administrative
Rate Orders;
OSHA: Employer Liability for Employee
Violations.
Other Current articles of interest are:
Donald N. Zillman, The Changing Meanings
of Discretion: Evolution in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 76 MIL. L. REV. 1 (1977).
Captain John S. Cooke, The United States
Court of Military Appeals, 1975-1977:
Judicializing the Military Justice System, 76
MIL. L. REV. 43 (1977).
Major Norman G. Cooper, O'Callahan Revi-
sited: Severing the Service Connection, 76 MIL.
L. REV. 165 (1977).
Captain David A. Schleuter, The Enlistment
Contract: A Uniform Approach, 77 MIL. L.
REV. (1977).
Major M. Scott Magers, A Practical Guide to
Federal Civilian Employee Disciplinary Ac-
tion, 77 MIL. L. REV. 65 (1977).
Captain William S. Ostan, Unionization of
the Military: Some Legal and Practical Con-
siderations, 77 MIL. L. REV. 109 (1977).
Capital John Robert Cotton, The Rights of
Mercenaries as Prisoners of War, 77 MIL. L.
REV. 143 (1977).
Major Delroy J. Gorecki, Evidentiary Use of
the Voice Spectrograph in Criminal Proceed-
ings, 77 MIL. L. REV. 167 (1977).
Frazier, Labor Arbitration in the Federal
Service, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 712 (1977).
Vance, Human Rights and Foreign Policy, 7
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 223 (1977). (The au-
thor is Secretary of State Cyrus Vance.]
Cohn, International Adjudiction of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human
Rights: A Survey of its Procedural and Some
of its Substantive Holdings, 7 GA. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 315 (1977).
Note, Progress Report on United Nations
Human Rights Activities to Protect Prisoners,
7 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 467 (1977).
Dellapenna, The Citizenship of Draft Evad-
ers After the Pardon, 22 VILL. L. REV. 531
(1976-1977).
Munnecke, Mandatory CLE-
Recertification, 24 FED. B. NEWS 228 (1977).
Committee News, Military Legal Assistance
Resolution Adopted, 24 FED. B. NEWS 236
(1977).
Power, The Fox in the Chicken Coop: The
Regulatory Program of the U.S. Army Corps
of Engineers, 63 VA. L. REV. 503 (1977).
Fryer, Applicability of International Law to
Internal Armed Conflicts: Old Problems, Cur-
rent Endeavors, 11 INT'L LAW. 567 (1977).
Marino, The Occupational Safety and Health
Act and the Federal Workplace: Implementa-
tion of OSHA by the Departments of Defense
and the Navy, 29 JAG J. 125 (1977).
Swayze, Traditional Principles of Blockade
DA Pare 27-0-59
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in Modern Practice: United States Mining of
Internal and Territorial Waters of North Viet-
nam, 29 JAG J. 143 (1977).
Mills, Procedural Requirements for Searches
of Civilians by Military Officials on Overseas
Installations, 29 JAG J. 175 (1977).
Case Notes
Legal Profession -Witnesses -- Contingent
Fees for Expert Witnesses - Person v. Associ-
ation of the Bar of the City of New York, 414
F. Supp. 139 and 414 F Supp. 144 (E.D.N.Y.
1976), reversed on appeal, 544 F.2d 584 (2d
Cir. 1977), 1977 Wis L. REV. 603 (1977)
Gall, Maritime Law: Admiralty Jurisdiction:
Damages Accidentally Caused to a Ship on
Navigable Waters by a Missile Fired From a
Navy Airplane Bears a "Significant Relation-
ship to Traditional Maritime Activity." Falg-
out Boats v. United States, 508 F. 2d 855, 1975
A.M.C. 843 (9th Cir. 1974), 29 JAG J. 196
(1977).
Lewellyn, Constitutional Law: Search and
Seizure: An Extension of the Exclusionary
Ez
It has come to the attention of the editor that
two paragraphs wandered away from their in-
tended place in the Legal Assistance Items in
the June 1977 issue of The Army Lawyer. The
first two full paragraphs on page 31 (the para-
graphs beginning "The ACA should be repre-
sented . . . ." and "The Agency's participa-
Rule in the Area of Military Searches Con-
ducted Overseas. United States v. Jordan, 24
C.M.A. 156, 51 C.M.R. 875 (1976), 29 JAG J.
207 (1977).
Book Reviews
Fleischman, Book Review, 45 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 879 (1977). [Review of MURRAY B.
NESBITT, LABOR RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT SERVICE (1976).]
Campbell, Book Review, 29 JAG J. 216 (1977).
[Review of ANGELA RODDEY HOLDER,
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW (1975).]
Major F. John Wagner, Book Review, 76
MIL. L. REV. 189 (1977). [REVIEW OF MILTON
R. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES
OF REAL PROPERTY (1975).]
DoD Instruction
Department of Defense Instruction Number
6015.18, 18 August 1977, establishes DoD pro-
cedures for control of smoking in DoD occupied
buildings and facilities.
Tata
tion .... ") should have appeared at the bot-
tom of the right hand column on page 29, just
below the paragraph beginning "The President
expressed ... ." All paragraphs have been in-
structed that in future issues wandering will
not be authorized.
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